After the Wales summit: What’s next for NATO?
- By defencematters
The Alliance should start planning for a scenario where Russia is able to deny access to key spots on the Eastern Flank – An interview with Julianne Smith, Centre for a New American Security (CNAS)
by Octavian Manea
Last year’s summit in Wales was a promising start for NATO, but it is hardly enough for responding to the myriads of challenges that Russia is posing to the European security order. The Alliance should start planning for a scenario where Russia is able to deny access to key spots on the Eastern Flank. The geography of control is changing fast so NATO should start catching up.
An interview with Julianne Smith, Centre for a New American Security (CNAS)
What is the impact of the access denial for US Asian allies and US security guarantees? What is the relevance of these maturing capabilities for NATO and the Eastern Flank?
China in particular is modernizing and building up its military (ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, air defenses and counter-maritime forces) in order to deny access to its territory, primarily sea and air. In this, its overarching strategy is to make it virtually impossible for the US should it desire to engage militarily in accessing Chinese territory.
From a strategic standpoint the US has worked very hard to develop capabilities that can deal and counterbalance that strategy. That is the basis for what we call Air Sea Battle, which is a concept that is prevalent in strategic military documents and the military doctrine of the DOD. While the US has been very consumed with these concepts, we do not use the term and we do not apply it to other regions of the world. This is a mistake. The US should be thinking in those terms when it comes to Russia’s approach not only to its own territory, but to the states in the neighborhood, whether we are talking about the immediate neighborhood or the states that are on the periphery of NATO, just outside or inside NATO territory.
In this case what we see is that Russia is currently testing a number of theories through its extensive probing-in the airspace above the Baltic States, in the sea (in both the Baltic and Black Seas) and on land (the capturing of an Estonian intelligence officer). They too are pursuing a strategy that would enable them to deny NATO (both Europe and the US) access to either European territory or their own territory, so we need to be thinking more creatively.
Years ago, US and NATO could move forces very easily across the European continent, back and forth, North-South, East-West we had everything calculated, we knew exactly how we moved forces. Today we no longer know what bridges we will use, what rail-lines are available. For that reason we’ve seen General Hodges and General Breedlove starting to test the ability to move forces across the continent demonstrating that if something happens then NATO will be ready.
Do you see the need to build our own A2/AD bubbles in order to create a safe environment for the NATO reinforcements?
We have to be sure that in a crisis we can move forces to where they are needed. For this reason we had the Dragoon Ride exercise. General Hodges decided to take the Stryker Brigade and have them actually physically drive across the European continent to test bridges. The second thing is that Russia can also deny us access in other realms. In this case cyber is a good example.
If, in fact, we need to come in the defence of the Baltic States or anyone else, Russia without a doubt will try to use their cyber capability to weaken our ability to access the conflict zone. We have to make sure that we maintain dominance over the cyber domain. I am talking about the global commons, assuring that we have access from the sea, from space, that we have the right capabilities, including conventional. The likelihood of Russia relying on conventional forces to make a move in CEE countries is very low. You still have to prepare for it, but more importantly you have to prepare for hybrid warfare and how they will use other tactics to deny us access to the people and the territory of Europe. So it is multi-dimensional and I don’t think we are doing enough in this area. We need to be talking about this inside NATO, bilaterally with our allies.
Are the Wales summit initiatives enough to reassure the Eastern Flank? Should NATO complement the expeditionary promise by deploying combat troops and going beyond the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act?
The Wales summit was a good start and a necessary one. But I don’t feel that it is enough. I hope that the Warsaw summit next year will put forward additional ideas and initiatives. I feel that Russia is the one that jeopardized the foundation of the Russia-NATO Founding Act and they are in fact responsible for the decay of the relationship between Russia and NATO. As such, I don’t feel as passionate about upholding the original principles of the agreement in the light of what they’ve done in Ukraine. I would not have an issue with the permanent presence of US troops in CEE countries. I do think it is a good compromise through constant rotations. Exercises will help and should be increased. Personally I would take it a step further.
Is it an accident that these counter-intervention capabilities are primarily developed by powers that display anti-status-quo ambitions towards their neighborhoods?
It is clear that they understand that the US has unmatched military superiority. What they will do - and we’ve seen this with non-state actors, whether you are Al-Qaeda, ISIS or Russia - is to determine where the US will have weaknesses and try to capitalize on those weaknesses. Lately, we have seen the emergence of a huge array of asymmetric packages for this reason. No one wants to have a direct military confrontation with the US. What they are trying to figure out is how you weaken a power projection effort, how you capitalize on any weaknesses in our conventional and military structures, whether or not there are things that you can do below the threshold that will not trigger a conventional military attack.
Russia was very careful not to do anything that would trigger an article 5 response or a proper military response on the part of the US. Putin knows that he can get away if he keeps it below a certain standard and by pursuing these tactics he can be secure of any direct military confrontation with the US.
To what extent are the Russian access-denial capabilities a threat for the regional commons in the Baltic and Black Seas?
First and foremost, Russia is challenging the core of the international system, is challenging the core of the liberal order, the norms, laws and rules of the game that the West spent 70 years establishing. They are also creating real operational concerns because there were too many near misses where Russian planes and ships were very close to Western military and commercial aircrafts and I worry that some day we’ll have a near collision or a tragic accident. There is also the concern about the degree to which there is now a contested space in the Baltic and Black Seas where clearly what they are trying to do is to assert more control over those spaces that should be open to all. They want to create an environment of fear, unpredictability and learn more about how to deny us access to those spaces in the event of a crisis. They are hitting us on multiple levels, there are operational concerns, international law concerns, there are real day-to-day tactical concerns and there are worries on our part about the degree on which we are going to be able to access areas and regional commons in the future.
Julianne Smith is Director of the Strategy and Statecraft Program at the Center for a New American Security. She served as the Deputy National Security Advisor to the Vice President of the United States from April 2012 to June 2013 and as the Principal Director for European and NATO Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon.
