Stavridis: NATO needs to be better at waging networked warfare
- By defencematters
Former SACEUR, Admiral James Stavridis talks about many of the lessons that the Alliance learned over the past decade in the Afghan theater which remain highly relevant as we face increased Russian hybrid aggression across the whole European spectrum.
By Octavian Manea
Many of the lessons that the Alliance learned over the past decade in the Afghan theater (working with local population to counter propaganda, strengthening institutions of local government, using strategic communication) remain highly relevant as we face increased Russian hybrid aggression across the whole European spectrum. It is the conclusion emphasized in an exclusive interview for Defence Matters by Former SACEUR, Admiral James Stavridis
The alliance learned a lot in terms of waging counterinsurgency in Afghanistan as well as in terms of providing support and enabling a host nation government. Is the Afghan stability operation legacy of NATO applicable in the proxy war in Ukraine? In the end the vulnerabilities in the fabric of state and society are a core raw material used there.
Yes I very much do. I think that a great deal of what we have learned in Afghanistan would be very helpful as we face increased Russian aggression not only in Ukraine, but across the whole European spectrum: counter-IED, working with local population to counter propaganda, strengthening institutions of local government, using strategic communication to move messages to large groups using all media (radio, print, internet, social networks), interoperability-the ability to bound together our forces to operate coherently, the use of UAV and intelligence gathering. All of this knowledge that we gained in Afghanistan is very applicable in what I would call counter-hybrid warfare.
Having in mind the Afghan legacy of the Alliance, do you see a role of NATO in the fight against ISIS?
I do. It is very important that NATO should be prepared to respond to the Islamic State in three ways.
First, it’s the instability along the Turkish border. This is one of NATO’s main borders crossed literally by millions of refugees. The potential of Islamic State to use refugee flows to get into Europe and NATO is extremely high. The border region of Iraq and Syria is a very clear danger to NATO.
Secondly it is the Mediterranean Sea and the ability of the Islamic State particularly in Libya to create instability and get into the refugees streams crossing to Italy and Europe. We also need to be prepared for the jihadists who hold European Union passports and are currently in the fight in Syria and Iraq. They are going at some point be able to come back to Europe. That is principally an intelligence, police and legal challenge, but NATO as an alliance can be helpful providing cyber, intelligence, information capabilities and in cases where there is higher degree of militarized activity. There are some places where the Alliance can be helpful even within the borders of Europe itself.
NATO is a full spectrum alliance, so it should be able to deal with both low and high-end spectrum warfare. What can NATO do in order to deter and respond to hybrid warfare?
First we have to study, observe and learn what the Russians are doing. Much of what is called hybrid warfare has been around for thousands of years. What is unique is combining all of the elements together, what is new is the cyber and the social networking component of it and taking them together and applying it in a European country. We need to study, understand the phenomena and reverse engineered so we could defeat it. We will not be able to rely on traditional military capabilities to stop this kind of activity. We will need to use many of the tools of the hybrid warfare themselves. It takes a network to defeat a network. And hybrid warfare is networked warfare. That means that NATO needs to be vastly better in cyber, much better in our strategic communications, our use of the social networks, we need to be able instantly to disprove the propaganda and the lies that are emanating from Moscow and much better in assisting the Ukrainian military in order to defend their nation against this invasion. We have work to do.
Libya has become a major incubator of refugees in the countries of Southern NATO. Should NATO have handled the Libya operation differently after the NATO intervention, especially in the very fragile post-Gaddafi environment? Do we need to learn a lesson here? Should NATO have assumed a role in the post-conflict reconstruction of Libya?
I think that NATO performed its required mission. The NATO mission was set by UN Security Council in two resolutions 1970 and 1973. Those resolutions required NATO to construct an arms embargo at sea, to put up a no-fly zone over Libya and to protect the population of Libya. NATO did all of those things and its mission concluded in the UN Security Council mandate. The post conflict responsibility fell to the UN and to some extent to the European Union as the local international organization with the most to gain by engaging in post-conflict reconstruction. It is obvious to any observer that a higher degree of participation post-conflict by the UN and EU would have been a very helpful and possible would have changed completely the situation we have today. But that was not a NATO responsibility but an EU one.
Is the inward-looking posture and the slow motion defense retrenchment of Great Britain affecting the ability of NATO to remain a healthy expeditionary alliance? Especially when most of the New Europe is pivoting on territorial defense.
I am also concerned about this. What makes the European nations good partners in the NATO alliance is not only the self-defense of the European continent, as important as that is, but there is more expected in today’s world because the threats are transnational. So the alliance in my view must preserve an expeditionary capability and the larger nations that have the resources need to maintain that ability as well. I am concerned about the cuts in the Great Britain, but on the other hand I am encouraged because they are moving forward with the construction of aircraft carriers which are the ultimate power projection capability. It is a mixed picture but the US is hopeful that the larger nations, particularly Britain, France, Germany, Italy will preserve some level of expeditionary capability. It is hard to do that unless you spend at least 2% of your GDP on defense. I will close by encouraging all the European partners to meet the self-imposed targets of spending 2%.
Has the time finally come to fix the un-healthy in-depth posture of NATO, by rebalancing it also on the Eastern Flank beyond the Decisions taken at Wales?
I believe that the measures at Wales were sufficient for the conditions existent last summer. As we continue to see aggression by Russia today, I think more reassurance is required, more forward operations on the Eastern Flank, more rotational deployments and I think it is time to consider a more permanent presence in the Eastern Flank.
Are the Baltic and Black Seas becoming no-go areas?
The Alliance will continue to operate its maritime forces on the high seas. We will demand that high seas freedoms that are foundations of the international law be respected. We would never permit areas like the Black Sea or the Baltic Sea to become “no-go areas”. That would be a complete failure on the part of the Alliance so we will continue to operate aggressively in those waters and I am not concerned that they will be turned into lakes for the Russians.
Admiral James G. Stavridis is Dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and former Supreme Allied Commander at NATO (2009 to 2013). He also served as Commander of U.S. Southern Command, with responsibility for all military operations in Latin America from 2006-2009. He is the author of The Accidental Admiral: A Sailor Takes Command at NATO, published in 2014.
