NATO Official: Russia’s Communication Strategy in Syria “A Complete Failure”
- By defencematters
Russia has alienated not only Europe and NATO, but also a large part of the Arab countries, as well as Turkey and Israel says NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Director Jānis Sārts.
Edgars Skvariks
During the first weeks of its operation in Syria, Russia has managed to alienate not only Europe and NATO, but also a large part of the Arab countries, as well as Turkey and Israel – “any actor, in fact, that plays some more or less significant role in the region,” as the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Director Jānis Sārts says in an interview with LETA and Defence Matters. He notes that the methods Russia has been using in Ukraine and Syria are very similar. “If Russia would attempt something like that in some other region, the “package of information would be easy to predict,” he adds.
The previous Director of the Centre, Jānis Kārkliņš, said in an interview with LETA that it was hard to say whether, during an information war, Latvia was easier to influence than other NATO member states. How has the situation changed during the past year?
Our studies of the so-called “troll effect” on society show that society is aware of propaganda and that it is meant to change people’s minds. Of course, it is a fact that society is divided and there are different groups that use propaganda in order to maintain different sources of information and different kinds of information. People live in different information spaces, although I would say that now, one year since all those events in Ukraine, the development that Russia lies to the public has become a universally-recognised fact, regardless of what or who the given person believes. Therefore I would not say that our society is easy to influence. I even believe that, historically, people remember what propaganda is, and can recognise it. And yet, our society is divided and that, too, carries additional factors of vulnerability.
Is Latgale easier to influence with the help of information than Riga, Vidzeme, Zemgale, or Kurzeme?
If we keep repeating that Latgale is extremely vulnerable, that may materialise in one way or another. Of course, there are factors in Latgale that make it different from the general picture, but no trends have been observed during the past six months which would indicate that Latgale somehow stands out against the overall information backdrop. I have a feeling that the same elements we can see in Riga can also be observed in Latgale, for instance. Certainly, there is the specific factor of Latgale being a border region, deeper economic ties with Russia or Belarus, but not in other areas – not anymore.
Is any NATO member country more vulnerable than others in this respect?
Every country and every region has some elements of vulnerability, which may differ vastly, beginning with the structure of society – which in our case is one of the problems. Likewise, there is a large number of similar phenomena in Eastern and Western European countries that can be used in order to influence these societies. I would not want to say, destabilise, but I could say – make them weaker. There is this something in every country. Nobody is perfect, and neither are the processes that radical groups may try to use. Society’s displeasure with the economic processes can also serve as a pretext.
Your centre is tasked with conducting research and providing recommendations for member country governments. For how many countries have you made recommendations?
Our main task is to provide recommendations to NATO and its member states, as well as organise training and develop new doctrines and methodologies. This November, there will be a string of studies and conclusions about the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and studies of Russia’s information operations are continuing. In addition, there will be studies into the operations and methodologies of the so-called “Islamic State”. We are also watching what is already happening in the information space, including Russia’s operation in Syria, and the refugee rhetoric. I need to emphasise that we are looking into refugees not as a phenomenon, but as rhetoric. Although it is not research per se, we are closely following all the developments, using the so-called quick analysis.
We also wish to gain time so NATO would be perfectly able to orientate itself and operate in the new environment. We want decision-makers to be much better educated in these areas. The effect of the virtual environment on communications is the most interesting and fascinating. The effect of mobile technology on not just Latvian society but on any person, including in Africa where Internet infrastructure will be soon accessible to a large number of people. We want to be in tune with the times, so our knowledge would enable us to protect our communities.
Do NATO member states take your recommendations into consideration, and are they being implemented?
In Latvia we organise training of senior officials, including special courses on what is happening in the social media, what methodologies are used in an information war. We also demonstrate specific examples from Estonia and Lithuania, how these matters are tackled elsewhere. And of course, there also are quick recommendations.
What exactly is taught at such training sessions?
We talk about what strategic communications are, what are the methods that our potential adversaries use to achieve their goals in the information space. We also inform about social networks, how they affect the information space. There are a lot of interesting phenomena, which have begun to emerge comparatively recently. Furthermore, we do in-depth analysis of individual cases, as it is very important to understand the methodology of an enemy. Sometimes, a few steps are taken through methods involving a manipulation. And it can often be seen how we fail in such situations.
Could you give an example?
I do have examples, but I do not believe that they are meant for the public. I present such information to those concerned. These cases can be observed in Latvia, and even more so in other European Union member states. There is such a Russian method as reflexive control, an entire methodology that people often fall for. Quite often people do things, the consequences of which contribute to the effects that the enemy wants to achieve, they can even be described as shooting themselves in the leg.
Are we talking about society in general, or about state officials?
Society is too large. You find ways, people, groups of people, and then entice them into certain decisions. Often the entire story is about seeing past the first impression, that which may seem obvious.
Not so long ago, Latvia’s officials were talking about the importance of strategic communications quite often, but now it can be observed increasingly more seldom. Could it be that the interest in strategic communications has faded away over the past twelve months?
I would hope that people are starting to realise that something is happening. We at the centre can see just the contrary – the interest in strategic communications is increasing, and that is why so many visits take place at the centre, in particular from the countries of our region, including from Finland and Sweden. We familiarise them with our research and with the problem as such. Taking into consideration that the importance of the virtual environment will only increase in the future, so will the importance of strategic communications.
As the interest about the centre’s activity increases, have you also observed propaganda targeting your work?
I have to say that, during the past two months, I have collected quite a voluminous file of what has been said about us in various places and environments.
Has the centre’s computer network been attacked too?
Not to my knowledge. Most of the studies done at the centre are meant for the public and we make them public on a regular basis. Of course, our information also has to do with the methodology of training, and that, indeed, is classified information. Nevertheless, it does not make up a large part of what we do.
At the end of August, your centre organised the conference “The Riga StratCom Dialogue: Perception Matters” at the Latvian National Library in Riga, which mostly focused on the so-called “Islamic State”. Could we say that the centre’s work at the moment mostly focuses on studying types of this terrorist organisation’s communications strategy?
This is a NATO centre following matters that are important for the entire NATO, and Russia - with its propaganda, is just one of the phenomena. I should also say that the “Islamic State” is quite an interesting phenomenon – what they do, how they use social media networks, how they operate in environment that they would otherwise try to shun. With the help of social networks, these terrorists not only disseminate propaganda and find recruits, it is one of the elements of their organisation.
So we might say that the “Islamic State” would not exist if not for the social media networks you mentioned?
It certainly would not.
Have there been any changes in Russia’s communications in the wake of the invasion of Syria?
In the centre’s opinion, Russia has failed miserably in this regard, as we can see that, during the first few weeks of its operation in Syria, Russia has been able to alienate not only Europe and NATO, but also a large part of Arab countries, as well as Turkey and Israel – any actor, in fact, that plays a more or less significant role in the region. In our opinion, other ways were also possible how Russia could have made the situation harder to understand – what they are planning and doing in Syria. I would say that, although Russia has in essence declared war on the “Islamic State”, nobody, except the people of Russia, believes that anymore. They have made a mistake, which caused a number of consequences.
We can also say that Russia has made a poor choice of goals and visualisations. It has been a huge failure, as you cannot talk about the exact weapon types the enemy has during the first stage. Another important factor is that their methodology is similar to how Russia went about its information campaign in Ukraine. There was denial, followed by fact, and then the rhetoric – prove us wrong! So the methods are very similar. If Russia attempts something like that in some other region, the info package of will be easy to predict.
What could Russia try to do next in Syria, in terms of information?
Russia will try to control the public space and continue to disseminate its opinion. Unlike the operation in Crimea and Ukraine, only about half of Russia’s residents support the operation in Syria. Russia will put every effort into legitimising its presence in Syria. I do not believe, however, that they could achieve some notable progress as compared with Europe or other players in the region. I would rather say that there are no options for Russia at the moment. They do hope that Bashar al-Assad’s troops will be able to press on, but to be frank, I doubt it.
Is it possible that all of this has caused people to take less interest in Ukraine?
One of the goals of information war is to have less people talk about Ukraine. Russia, however, has not attained what its actions in Syria intended – that others will try to find ways to co-operate with Russia. That they have not achieved. Russia is still trying to play against us – the West and Europe. For this reason, Russia is still considered an opponent, and Europe’s policy on Ukraine will remain unchanged.
Does NATO have clear steps in mind how to counter the propaganda of the “Islamic State”?
No one has said that NATO has to deal with it. NATO has 28 member states, and so far none has said, NATO, solve this!
Perhaps you have noticed some changes in the “Islamic State’s” propaganda since Russia’s incursion in Syria?
Not much has changed, as during the first few weeks, 80% of Russia’s targets were not targets in the “Islamic State” but in moderate rebel areas. So these attacks are, in one way or another, in the interest of the “Islamic State”. If Russia succeeds at suppressing the moderate rebels, either the “Islamic State” or the current regime will be in power.
Is the centre’s analysis of Russia’s propaganda as intense, or is it done in secrecy, fearing a possible counter-reaction?
I believe that it is not about a possible counter-reaction. We do not want to be seen as a centre set up for one sole purpose, as we work on strategic communications and the development of NATO and its member countries’ capacities in this area. The main phenomenon today may be completely different from what we will have tomorrow, and then there may be something altogether different the day after tomorrow. The importance of strategic communications will only be growing as the development of virtual environment continues in the future, therefore there will be more players at the international arena, trying to improve their skills. We have to be fully prepared.
Some experts have said, commenting on NATO’s preparedness in this field, that the Alliance has overslept...
Let us say that there was a certain feeling of complacency. We thought that Western values were self-explanatory, and that they would do everything for us. Now we can see that there are other players, not just Russia, active in this same area. Yes, I would agree that NATO is just waking up, and that much of our work is meant for NATO to truly wake up and do the right thing, not continue to make mistakes.
What do the centre’s experts currently think about the offensive of Russia’s propaganda, its technological aspects and content?
We have a programme, which stipulates that 42 different projects have to be implemented annually. More than half of these we receive from NATO headquarters, and less than half from the Alliance’s member states. There may be different ways to approach a job, but mostly we contract researchers in three different areas, who then gather and collate data. We then look for what is common in these findings, take operative measures that we can later include in the methodology. I have to say that we wish to create some kind of a strategic communications guide in the next two years, which would include methods and solutions. That, however, requires collating a number of research projects into one, which will take time, but we hope to commence work on the project already next year.
Research presentations at the said NATO conference noted that the so-called “trolling” did not have a major impact on residents after all.
The first question today is whether banning something really works. I recently saw a news story that Russia had tried to see whether it could disconnect itself from the Internet. The conclusion was no. Therefore I believe that the best methodology in this regard is to let people view a troll as a troll. There could be simple solutions here – a software solution based on a set of parameters, which would notify the user that he or she is currently reading something written by a troll. Another important aspect is that trolling is a hired service. Trolling does not entail great initiatives, innovation, investment. It is like a contract. It is worth reminding that trolling as a phenomenon is not something new – it was created in the business environment, and adapted to political orders. What is dangerous is that trolls are used to distribute special spying software.
How does it happen?
In some cases, the comments section says – if the material seemed interesting to you, you can verify what you have read by going here. The link takes you to a site with some content, but beneath it all is some spyware that is then installed in the computer. We know of such cases.
If trolling does not produce such a great effect, why do they do it?
Maybe they have not been able to measure its effectiveness? But I have to admit that they do spend a lot of money without attaining the anticipated effect. And let us not forget that there is the emotional effect also. People mostly do not change their beliefs, but they may feel differently about what they think. Effects do exist. Maybe we exaggerate a little by saying that there is no impact. And yet, seeing these amounts that go into it all, I have to conclude once again that this is not the most efficient way to spend funds.
Is Russian propaganda also targeted at European businessmen who had economic relations with Russia, so they, with the help of their lobbies, would achieve that the economic sanctions against Russia be lifted?
That is another story – that is not propaganda but using agents of influence. There are groups of people for which certain conditions are created so they could change the situation on the other side. It maybe not so obvious now, but during the conflict in Ukraine, it was a moment of surprise for a number of European countries to see such a network of groups working towards this goal.
In the context of refugees, can we also observe Russian propaganda aimed at dividing the European Union?
At the moment, we are only just studying the information environment and comparing the situations in individual countries in order to arrive at common denominators. At the moment, we are not ready to make far-reaching conclusions.
How attractive does Russian President Vladimir Putin seem to residents of Latvia and other NATO member countries?
We have not analysed Latvia individually, but during a study done in several NATO member states comparatively recently, people were asked whether, in their opinion, Putin had contributed to global security. In the major NATO countries, up to 80% of respondents said they did not believe that Putin had done anything in fostering global security. Likewise, the results for Russia were proportionally inverted. Interestingly enough, information meant for consumption in Russia says the contrary – that everyone considers Putin a mighty leader. Quite often various Western ratings of most influential politicians, where Putin is on top, are used for the purpose. People are ecstatic if Putin is ranked higher than U.S. President Barack Obama. The only important detail they omit is that these rankings of influence do not say anything about a particular leader’s contribution to global security.
Photo Credit: LETA
