Lt. General Hodges: Russia is using hybrid warfare to create ambiguity

Lt. General Hodges: Russia is using hybrid warfare to create ambiguity
  • By defencematters

The Alliance is in the process of readjusting to a post Ukraine regional security environment. The RAP, the VJTF and the overall increased responsiveness are all part of this updated posture.Interview with Lt. Gen. Frederick “Ben” Hodges, commander of U.S. Army Europe.

by Octavian Manea

The Alliance is in the process of readjusting to a post Ukraine regional security environment. The RAP, the VJTF and the overall increased responsiveness are all part of this updated posture. It is in this context that US Army Europe has deployed a small footprint expeditionary capability able to provide the mission command for every exercise that is taking place in the Atlantic Resolve from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Ultimately, these continuous exercises are part of the reassurance package that help improve the ability of the Eastern Flank countries threatened by the hybrid warfare whose underlying purpose is to create ambiguity.

Interview with Lt. Gen. Frederick “Ben” Hodges, commander of U.S. Army Europe.

 

A defence in depth posture made sense in the permissive environment of the 1990s. So is this enough for today when increasingly we see a contested environment where as the latest US Army Operating Concept emphasises, hostile nations are fielding anti-access/area denial capabilities designed “to counter US power projection and limit US freedom of action”?

You are definitely correct about there being a contested environment from a cyber perspective. I am sure that any of our potential adversaries know, that,  for the US to come over in a large number would require access to ports and airfields, moving along the rails, so any adversary -- whether it is Russia or anybody else -- would do all they could to deny our ability to use those facilities. When Russia exercised last week, it deployed an Iskander rocket system in Kaliningrad, so they can reach the port of Riga from Kaliningrad. That is important. They also put the Iskander rocket system in Crimea, which they have illegally occupied from Ukraine,  in order to deny access to some parts of the Black Sea.

I don’t know if I agree with your assessment that NATO’s posture is still the same as it was in the 1990s. We came out of the Wales summit with two important things. All 28 nations, regardless of what they thought about Ukraine or regardless of what they thought their biggest concern was, agreed that we need to provide assurance to those allies that are closest to Russia. Number two the Alliance had to adapt through the RAP, the VJTF and an overall increased responsiveness. We have been working hard ever since Wales to develop these capabilities as well as improve the multinational corps North-East. Romania is leading the way to create a multinational division South-East based in Bucharest.

 

 

When we analyse the outcome of the Wales summit we can see that it is very much focused on the expeditionary solutions. Shouldn’t NATO opt for a mixed posture that combines expeditionary solutions (the spearhead force kind) with combat forward presence?

That is actually a good point that you make. The US Army is focused on improving what we call mission command which means you have smaller command posts that deploy forward that can reach back to the main base. For example right now at MK in Romania the US Army 4th Infantry Division has their forward command post with less than 90 people but is able to reach back all the way to Fort Carson, Colorado, through technology to do the things that in the past would have required 300-400 people forward in one place. That is a greatly improved expeditionary capability, very small foot print, easier to move around, but yet has the capability to provide the mission command for every exercise that is taking place in the Atlantic Resolve from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. That is a part of the adaptation. Clearly it is going to be important because Russia or any other adversary would not give us 6 months to get ready the way that Saddam Hussein did. We will have to be capable, immediately, of resisting whatever type of incursion or threat we might see.

Now, the first responsibility is for each nation itself. General Breedlove often says that defence starts at home, so each country has its own national defence plan and all of the countries of Eastern Europe, including Romania, are working hard to modernise and improve their defencive capabilities and forces.

That is part of the forward posture and in the Atlantic Resolve series of exercises you see US forces and other allies Dutch, Portuguese, British, Spanish, that are participating in these exercises, in all of these countries. So there is a forward presence, just not forward stationed.

 

How would you describe the features of the hybrid challenge that NATO is currently facing on the Eastern Flank and its proximity?

The underlying purpose of the hybrid warfare is to create ambiguity. It is not new. The Russians have been employing this sort of tactic for a very long time, whether they use misinformation, deception, infiltrate people into ethnic populations, attempt to bring down governments. So this is an old familiar tactic for them.

Having said that, the purpose of it is to create ambiguity; and for the Alliance this is important because it takes our great Alliance, all 28 nations, to agree before we can act as an Alliance. Half of the countries in NATO are worried about other threats, they won’t always immediately respond to a potential concern. The more ambiguity the Russians can create the more of a challenge it is for the 28 nations to agree to do something.

Now, the US and other countries have demonstrated for the past year in the Atlantic Resolve that we will provide assurance, that we are there with continuous exercises to help with that and to help improve the ability of those Eastern Flank countries to deal with potential threats.

An important part of this ambiguity is the way they use the law. Lawfare would be one aspect of it. For example the illegal occupation of Crimea. It is very important that we all continue to refer to it as ‘the illegal occupation of Crimea’ because if we don’t, then Russia will begin to assert new territorial boundaries out into the Black Sea for example.

These have serious implications for everybody; just as they are trying to make claims about the underwater ridges in the Arctic and the way they routinely violate the airspace and land boundaries of the Baltic countries.

They just passed a law last year calling for the extradition of 75,000 Lithuanian men who didn’t report to the Red Army conscription station depots back in 1991-1992, because the Soviet Union was coming apart and the Lithuanian government said that there is no need to report to the Red Army because they are no longer part of the Soviet Union. Well, last year when the Duma passed the law calling for the extradition of those men for being draft dodgers I thought that was ridiculous. It seemed almost a farce. But the people in Lithuania take it very seriously and the Foreign Ministry there advised them not to leave the EU because they could possibly be extradited. If you look at the map Lithuania has got Kaliningrad (part of Russia) on one side and Belarus on the other side and so much of their economy is tied to Russia. Now we are talking about real economic pressure, if they can’t cross into Kaliningrad or Belarus. This is an example of how they use the law, fair or not, to put pressure on these countries and to create problems.

 

What should the exposed member states do in order to create a credible deterrence system vis-à-vis this form of warfare?

You are familiar with what we call the DIME construct - diplomacy, information, military and economic.

In the information space - the I - we the West need to figure out how in a democratic society, where there is a very active media, we can counter the Russian narrative, where Russian leaders are not burdened with the requirement to tell the truth. They use information like artillery and rockets.

So our governments have got to figure out how they counter that with accurate information but in a much more aggressive active way. Journalists should laugh every time they hear from Mr. Lavrov say that the reunification of East and West Germany was illegal, that it is a myth or the mythology of the West.

But number two, you go to the M in DIME, each nation needs to accept responsibility for its own security, don’t look at NATO as a big bunker that they come and run into, but instead NATO is a collection of nations each of which contributes to the overall security. So each nation has to invest in well trained men and women, best possible equipment that is interoperable with other allies. I congratulated Minister Dusa for the decision of Romania to achieve 2% by 2017. That’s terrific and other nations need to do that.

 

 

Is the Black Sea becoming a ‘keep-out’ zone? Are the Crimean capabilities a danger for the regional commons and NATO littoral states? Can Russia target regional commons?

First of all, Turkey is such a great ally, they’ve been part of the alliance since 1952 and they do a very good job of ensuring compliance with the Montreux Convention, of who can come in and out of the Black Sea. They are very thorough and they have an exceptionally effective military, including the Navy as well as their Air Force and the Army. The Turks as our allies I am sure will continue to make sure that the Montreux Convention is complied with. But I think this is something that we have to watch: The amount of equipment and the denial capabilities that the Russians are putting in Crimea, which certainly could extend their ability to influence what goes on in the Black Sea. This is why it is important that Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey continue to maintain a strong maritime capability, that the rest of the Alliance continue to exercise the freedom of navigation in and out of the Black Sea within the framework of the Montreux Convention. If you don’t work hard to enforce that, then over time the Russians will have extended their influence in the Black Sea beyond what is appropriate and authorised.

Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges graduated from the United States Military Academy in May 1980 and was commissioned in the Infantry. His most recent operational assignment was as Director of Operations, Regional Command South, in Kandahar, Afghanistan. His last assignment was as Commander, NATO Allied Land Command from 2012 to 2014.

Photo Credit, United States Army: Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges (right), commanding general, U.S. Army Europe, talks with Maj. Gen. Sir George Norton (left), deputy commander, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Italy, at the Distinguished Visitor Day visit to Exercise ARRCade Fusion, Nov. 20, 2014.